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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Anthony Nicini, Jr., filed suit under 42 U.S.C.S 1983 and 
state tort law against Frank Cyrus, a Family Services 
Specialist with the New Jersey Department of Human 
Services, Division of Youth and Family Services ("DYFS"), 
and other defendants, alleging they violated his 
constitutional rights because he was abused by the person 
with whom he was staying while in DYFS custody. The 
District Court, which had earlier dismissed all claims 
against the other defendants and the official capacity claim 
against Cyrus, granted summary judgment in favor of 
Cyrus on the section 1983 claim and state tort law claims 
against him in his individual capacity, holding that the 







In February 1990, fifteen-year-old Anthony Nicini, Jr., 
was admitted to the John F. Kennedy Hospital's Crisis 
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Center (JFK) after an apparent suicide attempt. DYFS 
became involved when JFK notified it of Nicini's allegations 
that his father had physically abused him. Two DYFS 
caseworkers responded to JFK, and Nicini told them that 
he was afraid of his father, who "punches a lot" and 
"always hits with closed fist." App. at 212. Nicini also said 
that he had attempted suicide before. DYFS notified the 
prosecutor's office of Nicini's allegations and assisted his 
mother in obtaining a temporary restraining order against 
Nicini's father. DYFS also assigned caseworker Frank Cyrus 
to Nicini's case. 
 
Nicini continued to have difficulty at home and in school. 
According to a DYFS report dated September 27, 1990, 
Nicini slashed his wrists that month in an apparent suicide 
attempt and thereafter left home after an argument with his 
mother. The report states that Nicini "has no where to go 
and needs placement." App. at 214. DYFS was informed on 
October 9, 1990, that Nicini was not at school and that he 
had previously told the assistant principal that he would 
not return home.1 On October 10, 1990, DYFS received a 
call from the police in Cherry Hill, New Jersey, that Nicini 
had been located and that he had repeated his refusal to 
return home and again stated that his father was abusive. 
Ex. at 28. That same day, a DYFS caseworker contacted 
Nicini's mother, who said that she did not want Nicini to 
return home, and his father, who could not identify any 
relatives with whom Nicini could stay. Nicini's father came 
to DYFS to sign a foster care placement agreement. 2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See Exhibits to Nicini's Brief in Opposition to Summary Judgment at 
27 [hereafter "Ex."]. 
2. Although the parties have not educated us as to the meaning of this 
agreement, it appears that "[a] child may come into the custody of 
[DYFS] and be placed in foster care pursuant to either a voluntary- 
placement agreement or a court order." Matter of Guardianship of J.C., 
129 N.J. 1, 7, 608 A.2d 1312, 1314 (1992); see also N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 30:4C-11 (parent may apply for DYFS to "accept and provide such care 
or custody as the circumstances . . . may require"); Monmouth County 
Div. of Social Servs. on Behalf of DYFS v. C.R., 316 N.J. Super. 600, 603- 
05, 720 A.2d 1004, 1006-07 (N.J. Super. 1998) (describing placement 
pursuant to agreement whereby parents consented to DYFS placing child 
in foster care but retained their "parental rights and legal 
responsibilities," retained the right to terminate the agreement and ask 
for their child's return, and agreed to make payments for the child's 
care). 
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DYFS placed Nicini in the foster home of Dennis Armento 
but Nicini ran away on or before November 2, 1990. After 
Nicini was located, his aunt, Catherine Livingston, agreed 
to DYFS's request that Nicini stay with her. On or before 
December 31, 1990, Nicini ran away once again. Livingston 
had apparently become ill and DYFS arranged for Nicini to 
stay with Bonnie Nicini, another aunt. Cyrus then arranged 
that Nicini be evaluated by a psychiatrist, Dr. Charles 
Trigiani. Dr. Trigiani was unsure after Nicini'sfirst 
appointment on January 3, 1991, whether Nicini required 
inpatient psychiatric care but agreed to recommend Nicini's 
evaluation at JFK. On January 10, 1991, Cyrus informed 
Nicini's mother of Dr. Trigiani's recommendation and 
requested that she bring Nicini to JFK. 
 
What happened thereafter is not clear from the record or 
the appendices submitted with the parties' briefs, but 
apparently Nicini was not admitted to JFK at that time. 
However, a DYFS report dated January 30, 1991 notes that 
Nicini was at JFK Hospital with an infected hand and might 
require admission to treat the infection. Bonnie Nicini 
reportedly stated that the plan was to hospitalize Nicini for 
depression. The report also states that when the hospital 
sought consent from Nicini's mother for his treatment, she 
refused and claimed he was in DYFS custody. At some 
point thereafter, Nicini was transferred to JFK's psychiatric 
unit for evaluation. On February 5, 1991, DYFS learned 
that Nicini had run away from the psychiatric unit after 
JFK recommended the possibility of admitting Nicini to 
treat his depression. 
 
Nicini ran to the home of Edward and Dolores Morra in 
Cherry Hill, New Jersey. Nicini's older brother Danny had 
gone to school with their children and had stayed with 
them while experiencing similar family problems. On 
February 9, 1991, the police notified DYFS that they had 
located Nicini at the Morra home. According to a DYFS 
incident report, Nicini had been taken to JFK but was 
"ready for discharge." Ex. at 72. A DYFS caseworker (not 
Cyrus) contacted Catherine Livingston, who stated that she 
had known Nicini was at the Morra home and that she 
would not permit him to return to her home. The 
caseworker then spoke to Nicini's father, who expressed his 
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belief that the Morras were "not [a] good placement but 
[who] agreed to weekend placement." Ex. 69 (emphasis in 
original). After being given the option of taking Nicini home 
or locating a relative with whom Nicini could stay, Nicini's 
father told the caseworker to speak to Livingston. She, of 
course, had already refused to take Nicini back. 
 
The caseworker then permitted Nicini, who "was refusing 
to go anywhere else," Ex. at 69, to return to the Morra 
home that day, Saturday, February 9, 1991. The incident 
report states that "Frank Cyrus will contact[the Morras] on 
Monday [February 11]." Ex. at 70. 
 
Between February 9, 1991 and February 28, 1991, Cyrus 
visited Nicini twice at the Morra home. He also had 
telephone contacts with Nicini and the Morras. App. at 226.3 
Cyrus's first visit was apparently on Monday, February 11, 
1991. App. at 250 (expert report). It was Cyrus's overall 
impression that "everything was positive," App. at 226-27, 
and that everything "point[ed] towards[Nicini] doing well 
there and becoming stabilized and progressing . . . ," App. 
at 228. Additionally, a counselor from an outreach center 
visited Nicini once a week at the Morra home. During that 
same time period, Cyrus performed a perpetrator ("PERP") 
check on the Morras, which would have revealed any 
criminal record of sexual abuse in the state of New Jersey, 
including any reports of such abuse to DYFS. The PERP 
check revealed nothing. 
 
Cyrus interviewed the Morras during a home visit. He did 
not remember asking whether they had ever had any 
contact with any law enforcement agency but he recalled 
asking Edward Morra if anything would prevent him from 
becoming a foster parent, and Morra replied in the negative. 
 
On February 28, 1991, Nicini appeared at a hearing 
before the Honorable Vincent D. Segal in the Family Part of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The statements in this and the following paragraph are taken from 
Cyrus's deposition. Only some portions of that testimony have been 
provided to us; others are summarized in the report of Dr. Eliot Atkins, 
a forensic psychologist retained by Nicini in this litigation. We 
designate 
the latter by "expert report." Neither party has suggested that Dr. 
Atkins's summary is inaccurate in this respect. 
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the Chancery Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey. 
Although the record does not make clear the purpose of the 
hearing, the proceedings were apparently related both to 
certain criminal conduct by Nicini and to where he should 
be placed. As a result of the hearing, Judge Segal 
sentenced Nicini to two years probation and also concluded 
that Nicini should remain with the Morras. 
 
Cyrus was present and testified at the hearing along with 
Nicini, Nicini's mother, and Catherine Livingston, Nicini's 
aunt. Also present were the Assistant Prosecutor for 
Camden County, New Jersey, and Ronald DeSimone, an 
attorney representing Nicini. Cyrus informed the court of 
Nicini's prior placements and that Nicini: 
 
       is currently with a friend and the family, the Morra  
       family.4 He's not with a foster family. Tony was with 
       the foster family initially, Mr. Dennis Armento, and he 
       left the home unofficially . . . . 
 
       . . . . 
 
       Tony found his way to the Morras, who I guess was a 
       friend of his. The Morras indicated they would -- they 
       knew him, they liked him and they wouldn't mind him 
       staying there. He's been there now for a couple of 
       weeks. They have indicated that he's doing very well 
       there, no problems. But that is not an official foster 
       home, that's an unofficial home. 
 
App. at 154-55. 
 
In response to the court's query whether the Morras 
would qualify as para-foster parents, Cyrus stated: 
 
       Yes they would, your Honor. We've -- so far the only 
       thing I've done is a perp check, perpetrator check, and 
       there's nothing that's come up. There's no -- nothing 
       we've seen in terms of any problem with the law. 
       Although I think, and Mrs. Nicini can speak for herself, 
       I think she has some objections about it on a full time 
       basis. But the family seems to show an interest 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Morras are referred to throughout the transcript of the hearing as 
the Moores, which, we presume, reflects an error in transcription. We 
have therefore substituted the correct name. 
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       towards Tony, they have said they wouldn't mind 
       keeping him -- keeping him on a temporary basis. He 
       has been stable since he's been with them. But like I 
       say that's -- right now they are not an official foster 
       family, although I'm sure they would -- they would 
       apply for para-foster custody if the parents are willing 
       to let them. 
 
App. at 156-57. 
 
When Judge Segal asked Nicini's mother for her 
comments, she stated as to the Morras: 
 
       [T]hey have harbored my oldest son on several 
       occasions when he had taken off . . . . I don't know 
       them personally, only -- only what I had heard. My 
       oldest daughter knows -- goes to school with kids that 
       are friends with Eric Morra, their son, which I believe 
       is 16 or 17, and I've been told that he's into drugs. I 
       don't know if it's true or not, but it's just what I've 
       heard. I don't know, something just seems strange 
       about these people, why they would -- if they don't 
       know Tony, why they would even take him in. 
 
App. at 158. 
 
Nicini's attorney suggested to the court, in light of these 
concerns, that Nicini "should also be monitored for drugs 
periodically and -- and maybe something should be looked 
in with this Morra family, in light of what Mrs. Nicini had 
said I think maybe a closer investigation on whether or not 
that's an appropriate placement . . . ." App. at 163. 
 
Nicini's own testimony regarding his stay with the Morras 
was positive. After recounting the difficulties he experienced 
with his parents and with his prior placements, Nicini 
described his relationship with the Morras: 
 
       I don't love them or anything, but they're people I can 
       talk to. I mean ever since I been there almost every 
       night I've been up talking to Mr. Morra, his name is 
       Ed. I've been up most of the time talking to him about 
       how I feel about my parents and the way I've been 
       living and how I've been treated and all. 
 
App. at 164. Nicini also told Judge Segal that the Morras 
were tutoring him until he was re-enrolled in school. 
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Judge Segal then summarized the history of physical 
abuse at the hands of Nicini's father and summarized a 
report prepared by Nicini's outreach counselor (not Cyrus), 
which stated that Nicini was no longer suicidal and had 
made a "fine adjustment to the location where he's 
presently located." App. at 166. Judge Segal ruled that 
Nicini would "come[ ] under the care and supervision" of 
DYFS, that he would remain with the Morras "for so long as 
[DYFS] thinks that's an appropriate placement," App. at 
167, and that "[u]nder no circumstances is[DYFS] to return 
the boy to the home of his parents without the authority of 
the Court," App. at 169. Judge Segal specifically declined to 
order drug monitoring despite the request of Nicini's 
attorney because there was no indication that drugs were 
involved in the matter. 
 
The record is once again sparse regarding the time period 
after the February 28, 1991 Family Court hearing. On 
March 11, 1991, less than two weeks after the hearing, 
Cyrus forwarded to the Morras an application to become 
para-foster parents. The para-foster application process, as 
summarized in Cyrus's letter to the Morras, requires 
completion of an application form, a financial statement, an 
authorization for release of information, a police reference 
form, and an agreement between the state of New Jersey, 
DYFS, and the foster parent. The applicant must also 
schedule a visit to DYFS for fingerprinting, and DYFS 
conducts a Home Study Evaluation. The applicant's 
fingerprints are used to conduct a National Crime Institute 
Check (NCIC). The Morras never returned the application, 
and, as we know from hindsight, there was no opportunity 
for Cyrus to follow up. 
 
On March 15, 1991, four days after Cyrus sent the 
application to the Morras, Nicini fled the Morra home. He 
later told investigators that since the second or third day of 
his arrival there, Edward Morra had been providing him 
with drugs and alcohol and assaulting him sexually. 
Further investigation revealed that Edward Morra had been 
convicted in New York in 1975 for corrupting the morals of 
a minor and for distribution of controlled substances to 
minors.5 In March 1994, following the events described 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The record does not reveal the exact nature of Edward Morra's New 
York conviction. Nicini's brief on appeal characterizes it as corrupting 
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here, Edward Morra was convicted in New Jersey of sexual 
assault and is currently serving a forty-year state prison 
term with a period of parole ineligibility of twenty years. 
 
On May 19, 1995, Nicini filed suit in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey against Edward 
Morra, the New Jersey Department of Human Services 
("DHS"), DYFS, and Cyrus. Nicini alleged a substantive due 
process violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983 and various 
state tort law violations. In particular, Nicini alleged that 
Cyrus "had actual and/or constructive knowledge" of 
objections by Nicini's parents that "awarding custody to 
defendant, Edward Morra, was inappropriate in that .. . 
[he] permitted illicit narcotic and alcoholic use by minors at 
his residence." App. at 136, 137. Nicini also alleged that 
Cyrus "failed to fully and properly investigate the 
background of Morra before [placing him] . . . in Morra's 
care" and that Cyrus "had access to or could have 
requested an authorization from Morra to conduct a 
criminal record background check." App. at 137. Nicini 
further alleged that DHS and DYFS had a policy and 
practice that "no criminal background check would be 
conducted of voluntary guardians of children in the custody 
of defendants if the guardian was a resident of the State of 
New Jersey." App. at 140. 
 
By order dated May 29, 1996, the District Court 
dismissed all claims against DHS, DYFS, and Cyrus in his 
official capacity based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
Although Nicini's complaint did not explicitly seek damages 
against Cyrus in his individual capacity, the court 
construed it as stating such a claim. The court held that 
Cyrus was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity 
and denied his requests for absolute and qualified 
immunity on the section 1983 claim. The court also held 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the morals of a minor and distributing controlled substances to minors. 
Nicini's complaint in this action, however, alleges Morra was convicted of 
sexual abuse of a minor, endangering the welfare of a minor, and 
distributing illicit drugs to a minor. The District Court's opinion 
describes Morra's conviction as for endangering the welfare of a child. 
The precise nature of Morra's conviction is irrelevant to the result we 
reach. 
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that Cyrus's request for immunity under New Jersey law as 
to Nicini's state law claims was premature. 
 
After discovery, Cyrus moved for summary judgment. In 
support, he submitted an affidavit in which he stated that 
he conducted a PERP check with the DYFS Central registry 
as required by DYFS policy when a child is in a home 
which is not a DYFS placement, that the PERP check 
revealed no criminal information regarding the Morras, and 
that a more complete criminal background check was 
unavailable to him at that time. Nicini filed no counter 
affidavit with respect to those averments. 
 
In an order dated October 29, 1997, the District Court 
granted summary judgment for Cyrus, holding that Nicini 
had failed to establish a constitutional violation and that 
his state law claims were barred by qualified immunity 
under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et 
seq. The court found, inter alia, that"DYFS policies only 
require a PERP check of families not associated with the 
state foster care program, and Cyrus conducted such a 
check." Nicini v. Morra, Civ. No. 95-2303, slip op. at 13 
(D.N.J. Oct. 29, 1997) [hereafter "Slip op"]. The court held 
that the facts adduced by Nicini, even when viewed most 
favorably to him, failed to demonstrate that Cyrus"knew or 
suspected the threat of sexual abuse which awaited plaintiff 
in the Morra home." Slip op. at 15. The court held that, at 
most, Cyrus was negligent and that negligence was 
insufficient to establish section 1983 liability or to defeat 
the New Jersey statutory immunity. 
 
Nicini's claims against Edward Morra proceeded and, on 
February 11, 1998, the court granted Nicini's motion for a 
default judgment against Morra. The case was then referred 
to a Magistrate Judge to conduct a hearing to determine 
the amount of Nicini's damages. In an order dated March 6, 
1998, the Magistrate Judge entered judgment by default 
against Morra and awarded Nicini $500,000 in 
compensatory and $500,000 in punitive damages. The 
Magistrate Judge, pursuant to the District Court's orders of 
May 29, 1996 and October 29, 1997, also entered judgment 
in favor of the other defendants. 
 
Nicini appealed from the order of March 6, 1998. 
Although his notice of appeal stated his intent to challenge 
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the court's May 29, 1996 order dismissing the claims 
against DHS, DYFS, and Cyrus in his official capacity, as 
well as the court's October 29, 1997 order granting 
summary judgment in favor of Cyrus in his individual 
capacity, Nicini has limited his challenge before us to the 
latter order. We have jurisdiction to review thefinal order of 




STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, 
applying the same standard used by the District Court. See 
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Assoc. Local 19 v. Herre Bros., 
Inc., 201 F.3d 231, 239 (3d Cir. 1999). We may affirm the 
District Court on any grounds supported by the record. See 
Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1999). 
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and 
affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In conducting our 
review, we view the record in the light most favorable to 




NICINI'S SECTION 1983 CLAIM 
 
To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate a violation of a right protected by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States that was 
committed by a person acting under the color of state law. 
See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). 
The first step in evaluating a section 1983 claim is to 
"identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to 
have been violated" and to determine "whether the plaintiff 
has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all." 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 
(1998). 
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Nicini's section 1983 claim rests on the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He invokes the 
substantive component of due process, which "protects 
individual liberty against `certain government actions 
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to 
implement them.' " Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 
503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 
U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). Specifically, Nicini alleges that 
Cyrus, acting under color of state law, deprived him of "the 
right to be free from the infliction of unnecessary pain or 
abuse . . . and the fundamental right to physical safety." 
App. at 52 (Nicini's brief in opposition to summary 
judgment). 
 
In denying Cyrus's request for qualified immunity on that 
claim, the District Court interpreted Nicini to assert a right 
"to be free from deprivation of liberty by reason of a foster 
care placement preceded by an investigation so lacking in 
thoroughness and precision that it can be said to shock the 
conscience," and held that such a right was clearly 
established at the time of Cyrus's alleged violation. App. at 
95. Indeed, Cyrus does not dispute that the rights Nicini 
asserts are protectable under section 1983. Cf. DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 
(1989) (right to " `free[dom] from . . . unjustified intrusions 
on personal security' ") (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
U.S. 651, 673 (1977)). Nor does Cyrus dispute that he was 
acting under color of state law. He contends, however, that 
Nicini has not established a constitutional violation because 
"[t]here is no way that Mr. Cyrus should or could have 
known about the tragic events that would occur at the 
Morra home." Appellee's Br. at 13. Nicini replies that Cyrus 
violated his constitutional rights by "fail[ing] to conduct a 
full and complete investigation of Morra . . . ." Appellant's 
Br. at 16. Nicini's argument relies on the principle that "a 
state's role in `placing children in foster homes' gives rise to 
a constitutional right of protection to the child . . . ." 
Appellant's Br. at 13. Although Cyrus does not contest that 
proposition, we must first determine whether this principle 




As a general proposition, a state's failure to protect an 
individual against private violence does not constitute a 
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violation of due process. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202. Thus, 
in DeShaney the Court held that a child who was beaten so 
severely by his father that he suffered permanent brain 
damage did not have a claim against the state agency for 
violation of his substantive due process rights by failing to 
remove him from his father's custody although agency 
personnel had reason to know of the abuse. However, the 
Court recognized that "in certain limited circumstances the 
Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative duties of 
care and protection with respect to particular individuals." 
Id. at 198. As examples of situations in which the state has 
such a duty, the Court cited its decision in Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), which held that the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment required the state "to provide adequate medical 
care to incarcerated prisoners," DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198, 
and Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), which held 
that substantive due process "requires the State to provide 
involuntarily committed mental patients with such services 
as are necessary to ensure their `reasonable safety' from 
themselves and others," DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199 
(citation omitted). 
 
The state's affirmative "dut[y] of care and protection," id. 
at 198, in those cases stemmed "not from the State's 
knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its 
expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation 
which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own 
behalf." Id. at 200. In holding that the state did not have 
such a "special relationship" with Joshua DeShaney, the 
Court explained that "[w]hile the State may have been 
aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the free world, 
it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to 
render him any more vulnerable to them." Id.  at 201.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Courts have seized upon this language in DeShaney to fashion 
another exception to the general rule absolving state actors of liability 
for 
harm caused by private parties: the state-created danger theory. This 
theory is "predicated upon the states' affirmative acts which work to 
plaintiffs' detriments in terms of exposure to danger" rather than upon 
a special relationship between the state and the victim. D.R. v. Middle 
Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1374 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(en banc). Nicini has not argued in this case that we should apply the 
state-created danger theory. Rather, he has proceeded solely under the 
"special relationship" theory. 
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Of particular significance to the matter before us, the 
Court also suggested that "[h]ad the State by the affirmative 
exercise of its power removed Joshua from free society and 
placed him in a foster home operated by its agents, we 
might have a situation sufficiently analogous to 
incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to an 
affirmative duty to protect." Id. at 201 n.9. The Court noted 
that several courts of appeals had already found such a 
duty in the foster care context but declined to comment on 
the merit of those decisions. See id. (citing Doe v. New York 
City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981); 
Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987) (en 
banc)). 
 
After DeShaney, many of our sister courts of appeals held 
that foster children have a substantive due process right to 
be free from harm at the hands of state-regulated foster 
parents. See, e.g., Lintz v. Skipski, 25 F.3d 304, 305 (6th 
Cir. 1994); Norfleet v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 989 
F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1993); Yvonne L. v. New Mexico 
Dep't of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 891-93 (10th Cir. 
1992); K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 848-49 (7th Cir. 
1990). These courts have accepted the analogy between 
persons the state places in foster care and those it 
incarcerates or institutionalizes. See, e.g., K.H., 914 F.2d at 
849 ("Once the state assumes custody of a person, it owes 
him a rudimentary duty of safekeeping . . ."); Yvonne L., 
959 F.2d at 891-93 (discussing and approving cases 
imposing liability in foster care context). 
 
We have suggested, although never directly held, that 
state actors owe a duty to children placed in foster care. In 
D.R., 972 F.2d at 1368-73, we held that a public high 
school student who was allegedly sexually molested by 
other students during school hours could not maintain a 
claim against school officials based on a "special 
relationship" theory. We held that public high school 
students were not comparable to prisoners or the 
involuntarily committed because "parents remain the 
[students'] primary caretakers," id.  at 1371, and because 
students "may turn to persons unrelated to the state for 
help on a daily basis," id. at 1372. We also noted that this 
court has principally read DeShaney as "setting out a test 
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of physical custody." Id. at 1370. For this proposition, we 
cited our decisions in Philadelphia Police & Fire Association 
for Handicapped Children, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 874 
F.2d 156, 168 (3d Cir. 1989) (refusing to apply the special 
relationship exception to impose upon the state an 
affirmative duty "to protect the mentally retarded living at 
home"), and Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children, 
Inc., 921 F.2d 459 (3d Cir. 1990) (entity that performed 
mental health intake services for the county and which 
referred plaintiffs' mentally retarded adult son owed him no 
affirmative duty of care because his parents voluntarily 
placed him in the institution and were free to remove him). 
 
In D.R., we recognized that "some courts have imposed a 
constitutional duty to protect foster children by analogy to 
involuntarily institutionalized individuals," 972 F.2d at 
1372, and stated, albeit in dictum: 
 
       A relationship between the state and foster children 
       arises out of the state's affirmative act in finding the 
       children and placing them with state-approved 
       families. By so doing, the state assumes an important 
       continuing, if not immediate, responsibility for the 
       child's well-being. In addition, the child's placement 
       renders him or her dependent upon the state, through 
       the foster family, to meet the child's basic needs. 
 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Horton v. Flenory, 889 F.2d 
454, 457 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that DeShaney  is limited 
"to situations in which the state is not involved in the 
harm, either as a custodian or as an actor" and that 
plaintiff was functionally in state custody where he was 
forcibly detained and beaten by bar owner, with police 
approval). 
 
We find our discussion in D.R. and the numerous 
decisions of the other courts of appeals on this issue 
persuasive. Foster children, like the incarcerated or the 
involuntarily committed, are "placed . . . in a custodial 
environment . . . [and are] unable to seek alternative living 
arrangements." Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795 
(11th Cir. 1987) (en banc). We now hold that when the 
state places a child in state-regulated foster care, the state 
has entered into a special relationship with that child 
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which imposes upon it certain affirmative duties. The 
failure to perform such duties can give rise, under 
sufficiently culpable circumstances, to liability under 
section 1983. 
 
We recognize that the analogy between foster children on 
the one hand and prisoners and institutionalized persons 
on the other is incomplete. For example, foster children, 
especially older ones, enjoy a greater degree of freedom and 
are more likely to be able to take steps to ensure their own 
safety. Nonetheless, any distinctions between children 
placed in foster care and the prisoners at issue in Estelle or 
the institutionalized mentally retarded persons at issue in 
Youngberg are matters of degree rather than of kind. See 
Norfleet, 989 F.2d at 292 (although there is a closer 
relationship between the state and prisoners than between 
the state and foster children, "the situations are sufficiently 
analogous"). In each of these cases the state, by affirmative 
act, renders the individual substantially "dependent upon 
the state . . . to meet [his or her] basic needs." D.R., 972 
F.2d at 1372. 
 
We are aware that Nicini came to stay with the Morras on 
his own initiative and that the Morras were not officially 
approved by the state as either foster or para-foster parents.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The parties' briefs are silent as to the precise meaning of "foster" 
and 
"para-foster" care. At argument, we were informed that foster parents are 
approved for the general placement of foster children rather than 
approved for the placement of a particular child. See also N.J. Admin. 
Code tit. 10, S 122B-1.4 (DYFS regulations defining foster parent as "any 
person approved by the Division for the general placement of children in 
his or her own home"). 
 
"Para-foster" care is not defined in the statute or regulations governing 
DYFS. The current regulations, however, refer to"para care," defined as 
"a service involving the placement of a child in a private family home by 
anyone other than DYFS, and which DYFS approves for payment after 
an approval process is completed." N.J. Admin. Code tit. 10, S 10:15-1.2. 
This is similar to a definition of "para-foster care," effective March 9, 
1987, contained in a DYFS Field Operations manual submitted to us as 
part of the appendix in this appeal which refers to"foster care service 
involving the placement of a child in a private family home by anyone 
other than DYFS, regardless of whether the child is already under DYFS 
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However, Cyrus does not contest that Nicini was in DYFS 
custody throughout the relevant period. Furthermore, the 
record is replete with evidence that Nicini was substantially 
dependent upon DYFS and that DYFS acquiesced in 
Nicini's stay at the Morra home. At least by October 10, 
1990, when Nicini's father signed a foster care placement 
agreement, DYFS was able to arrange for his foster 
placement. At some point, the Superior Court of New Jersey 
awarded custody of Nicini to DYFS and DHS. App. at 136. 
Nicini was thereafter placed on several occasions with 
DYFS-approved foster parents and with relatives. It also 
appears that after the police located Nicini at the Morra 
home and took him to JFK, DYFS returned him to their 
home over the objections of his aunt and his father. 8 Under 
these facts, we believe Nicini's situation is sufficiently 
analogous to a foster care placement to fall within the 




Having established that Nicini has alleged a protected 
interest and a sufficient relationship with the state to state 
a cause of action under section 1983, we turn to the 
District Court's determination that summary judgment was 
appropriate because Cyrus's actions did not amount to a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
supervision, and which DYFS approves for payment after an approval 
process is completed." App. at 171. Unlike foster parents, para-foster 
parents are "approved by DYFS for the income maintenance and services 
to [a] particular child and not for the placement of other foster 
children." 
Id. Nicini does not suggest that DYFS was precluded from approving his 
stay with the Morras if they were neither foster parents or para-foster 
parents. 
 
8. Livingston seems to have objected on the ground that Nicini "was a 
sick boy who needed hospitalization." Ex. at 67. The DYFS incident 
report that documents the objection of Nicini's father does not contain 
the basis for his objection (he apparently testified at his deposition 
that 
he informed a DYFS caseworker named Diana Smith of his belief that 
the Morra home was a "haven for runaway juveniles," App. at 250 
(expert report)), but it clearly states that he agreed to weekend 
placement 
with the Morras. The same report states that DYFS had "custody of 
Anthony through court order." Ex. at 70. 
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violation of Nicini's constitutional rights. We mustfirst 
determine what level of conduct is egregious enough to 
amount to a constitutional violation and, then, whether 
there is sufficient evidence that Cyrus's conduct rose to 
that level. 
 
We begin with the decision in County of Sacramento v. 
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998), where the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari "to resolve a conflict among the Circuits 
over the standard of culpability on the part of a law 
enforcement officer for violating substantive due process in 
a pursuit case." Id. at 839. In Lewis , the Court emphasized 
that " `[t]he touchstone of due process is protection of the 
individual against arbitrary action of government.' " Lewis, 
523 U.S. at 845 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 
558 (1974)). It then noted that where the challenge is to 
executive rather than legislative action, "only the most 
egregious official conduct can be said to be `arbitrary in the 
constitutional sense.' " Id. at 846 (quoting Collins v. Harker 
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)). Mere negligence is 
never sufficient for substantive due process liability. See 
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Under Lewis, 
substantive due process liability attaches only to executive 
action that is "so ill-conceived or malicious that it `shocks 
the conscience.' " Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 
368, 375 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846). 
 
The "exact degree of wrongfulness necessary to reach 
the `conscience-shocking level depends upon the 
circumstances of a particular case.' " Id.  at 375. At issue in 
Lewis was the conduct of police officers engaged in a 
pursuit, which the Court contrasted with the conduct of 
prison officials who face liability under the Eighth 
Amendment if they are "deliberately indifferent to the 
medical needs of their prisoners." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850 
(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The 
Court noted that "[a]s the very term `deliberate indifference' 
implies, the standard is sensibly employed only when 
actual deliberation is practical," and "in the custodial 
situation of a prison, forethought about an inmate's welfare 
is not only feasible but obligatory." Id. at 851. The Court 
also noted that " `the State's responsibility to attend to the 
medical needs of prisoners . . . does not ordinarily clash 
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with other equally important governmental 
responsibilities.' " Id. at 851-52 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 
475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986)). 
 
In the police pursuit context, the issue presented in 
Lewis, officers do not have "the luxury enjoyed by prison 
officials of having time to make unhurried judgments, upon 
the chance for repeated reflection, largely uncomplicated by 
the pulls of competing obligations." Id. at 853. It followed 
that "high speed chases with no intent to harm suspects 
physically or to worsen their legal plight do not give rise to 
liability under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 854. The 
Court recognized, however, that in some contexts conduct 
falling within a middle range of culpability -- that is, 
involving more than negligence but less than intentional 
conduct -- can be shocking in the constitutional sense. As 
the Court explained: 
 
       Rules of due process are not . . . subject to mechanical 
       application in unfamiliar territory. Deliberate 
       indifference that shocks in one environment may not 
       be so patently egregious in another . . . . 
 
Id. at 850. 
 
Lewis therefore makes clear that a plaintiff seeking to 
establish a constitutional violation must demonstrate that 
the official's conduct "shocks the conscience" in the 
particular setting in which that conduct occurred. In some 
circumstances, conduct that is deliberately indifferent will 
shock the conscience. Indeed, in the foster care context, 
most of the courts of appeals have applied the deliberate 
indifference standard, although they have defined that 
standard in slightly different ways. See, e.g., White v. 
Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1997) (liability if 
defendant was "plainly placed on notice of a danger and 
chose to ignore the danger"); Taylor, 818 F.2d at 796 (foster 
child must show "actual knowledge of abuse or that agency 
personnel deliberately failed to learn what was occurring in 
the foster home"); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 
649 F.2d 134, 145 (2d Cir. 1981) (deliberate indifference 
"cannot exist absent some knowledge triggering an 
affirmative duty to act . . . . Defendants may be held liable 
[for] . . . deliberate indifference to a known injury, a known 
risk, or a specific duty"). 
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In Miller, we evaluated the actions of a social worker who 
after receiving allegations of abuse separated a child from 
her natural parent under a standard that "exceed[ed] . . . 
deliberate indifference." Miller, 174 F.3d at 375. We held 
that the worker would be liable only if his conduct reached 
"a level of gross negligence or arbitrariness that indeed 
shocks the conscience." Id. at 375-76 (quotation omitted). 
We also stressed that although "a social worker acting to 
separate parent and child does not usually act in the 
hyperpressurized environment of a prison riot or a high 
speed chase . . ., he or she rarely will have the luxury of 
proceeding in a deliberate fashion." Id. at 375. Cyrus, 
unlike the social worker in Miller, had time"to make 
unhurried judgments" in investigating whether to permit 
Nicini to remain with the Morras. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853. 
In the context of this case, we agree that Cyrus's actions in 
investigating the Morra home should be judged under the 
deliberate indifference standard.9 
 
In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the Court 
clarified the deliberate indifference standard applicable in 
suits challenging prison conditions under the Eighth 
Amendment. It adopted a subjective standard of liability 
consistent with recklessness as that term is defined in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We note that in Youngberg, the Supreme Court held that 
"professional" decisionmakers would be liable for violating the 
substantive due process rights of an involuntarily institutionalized 
mentally retarded plaintiff if their conduct was"such a substantial 
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards 
as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the 
decision on such a judgment." 457 U.S. at 323. We applied this test on 
facts virtually identical to those in Youngberg  in Shaw v. Strackhouse, 
920 F.2d 1135, 1142-46 (3d Cir. 1990). See also Winston v. Children & 
Youth Servs., 948 F.2d 1380, 1390-91 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying standard 
to challenge by natural parents to policy granting visitation rights to 
children in foster care); Yvonne L., 959 F.2d at 893-94 (Eleventh Circuit 
applied the professional judgment test in the foster care context, but 
emphasized test is essentially same as deliberate indifference test). 
 
In response to our inquiry, neither Nicini nor Cyrus suggested that the 
professional judgment standard is appropriate. Therefore, we do not 
decide whether, consistent with Lewis, that standard could be applied to 
Cyrus's conduct. 
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criminal law. The Court held that "a prison official cannot 
be found liable . . . unless the official knows of and 
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; 
the official must both be aware of facts from which the 
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 
837. 
 
This case does not require us to determine whether an 
official's failure to act in light of a risk of which the official 
should have known, as opposed to failure to act in light of 
an actually known risk, constitutes deliberately indifferent 
conduct in this setting.10 We will assume arguendo that 
Nicini's proposed standard of "should have known" is 
applicable. Nevertheless, as Lewis makes clear, the relevant 
inquiry is whether the defendant's conduct "shocks the 
conscience." 
 
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree 
that Cyrus's conduct meets that standard. To the contrary, 
we conclude that Cyrus's conduct in investigating the 
Morras amounted, at most, to negligence. For the same 
reason, we need not consider whether failure to perform a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We recognize that the deliberate indifference standard applicable in 
Farmer to challenges to prison conditions does not necessarily apply to 
the substantive due process claims of a foster child. See City of Revere 
v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (pretrial 
detainees entitled under due process to "at least as great" protection as 
is afforded convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment); Spencer v. 
Knapheide Truck Equip. Co., 183 F.3d 902, 906-08 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(declining to decide whether pretrial detainee's claim should be judged 
by Farmer's subjective deliberate indifference standard or by objective 
standard); cf. Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 472 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(suggesting that "[t]o apply the Eighth Amendment standard to mentally 
retarded persons would be little short of barbarous"). Nevertheless, we 
note that after Farmer the courts of appeals have shown a tendency to 
apply a purely subjective deliberate indifference standard outside the 
Eighth Amendment context. See, e.g., Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 
195 F.3d 134, 141 n.6 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting"should have known" 
standard in due process action challenging conduct of school officials 
and other defendants in responding to complaints of racial harassment 
against student); Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 955-56 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(detainee's due process claims judged by Farmer  standard); Hare v. City 
of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 648 (5th Cir. 1996) (same). 
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specific duty can ever amount to deliberate indifference, see 
Taylor, 818 F.2d at 797; Doe, 649 F.2d at 145, as there is 




The District Court held that the evidence, viewed most 
favorably to Nicini, failed to establish that Cyrus's conduct 
was "deliberately indifferent" to Nicini's rights. The court 
held that Nicini "fail[ed] to establish that Cyrus knew or 
suspected the danger that awaited [Nicini] in the Morra 
home," slip op. at 12, and that "by following standard DYFS 
procedures and informing a family court judge of the scope 
of his investigation, Cyrus's failure to discover that 
conviction does not shock the conscience or demonstrate 
his deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard of 
[Nicini's] constitutional rights," id.  at 13. 
 
On appeal, Nicini contends that the District Court too 
narrowly construed Cyrus's responsibility by looking to 
whether Cyrus knew or suspected that Morra had a history 
of abusing children rather than whether Cyrus knew or 
suspected that the placement was unsafe. In its opinion 
granting summary judgment, the District Court stated the 
exclusive focus of the complaint involved Cyrus's failure to 
discover Morra's criminal background. Slip op. at 9. Even if 
we accept Nicini's broader view of the complaint, it would 
not change the outcome of the appeal, which still revolves 
around whether Cyrus was deliberately indifferent in any 
respect. 
 
In his affidavit, Cyrus stated: 
 
       The DYFS policies and procedures required that I 
       conduct a perpretrator [sic] "PERP" check with the 
       DYFS Central Registry when a child ends up at a home 
       which is not a DYFS placement. I conducted one. The 
       PERP check revealed no criminal information regarding 
       the Morras. DYFS can not access National Crime 
       Institute Check ("NCIC") . . . nor a State criminal 
       background check. 
 
App. at 145. Nicini does not argue that Cyrus failed to act 
in accordance with applicable DYFS policy and procedure. 
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To establish Cyrus's liability, Nicini offered only the 
report of Dr. Atkins, the psychologist he proffered as an 
expert, that Cyrus should have done more than was 
required of him by DYFS's practices and procedures. The 
relevant portion of that report states: 
 
        In light of the information available to Frank Cyrus 
       at the time of his investigation of the Morra household, 
       particularly the criminal record of Morra which was a 
       matter of public record and which could have been 
       obtained by an appropriate national police record 
       search with the permission of Morra being required by 
       Cyrus prior to placement, it is the opinion of this 
       clinician that this investigation was conducted with 
       total indifference to all available facts that were clearly 
       material to any social worker who would be called 
       upon to make such a placement. 
 
App. at 253. As is evident, Dr. Atkins believed that Cyrus 
should have undertaken a national police search (which the 
psychologist recognized required Morra's consent) even 
though the Morras were not applicants to become an official 
DYFS foster family or para-foster family. Dr. Atkins never 
explained how Cyrus could have performed what the 
psychologist termed the "appropriate national police record 
search" without Morra's cooperation and never responded 
to Cyrus's sworn statement that he could not access the 
National Crime Information Center. 
 
Unable to point to a state requirement or a DYFS policy 
or procedure violated by Cyrus, Nicini argues that Cyrus 
nonetheless should have been on notice that a more 
detailed investigation of the Morras was required. As to the 
period from the date DYFS learned where Nicini was, 
February 9, 1991, and the date of the Family Court hearing 
that approved Nicini's temporary placement status, 
February 28, 1991, the record reveals consistent 
monitoring and oversight by Cyrus and DYFS. On February 
9, Nicini was located at the Morra home and, after being 
taken to JFK, "was refusing to go anywhere else" than back 
to the Morra home. Ex. at 69. On that day, a DYFS 
caseworker visited with the Morras and made detailed notes 
about the condition of the home and the Morra family's 
willingness "to help Tony." Ex. at 69. Cyrus visited Nicini 
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twice during the following nineteen days and also made 
contact by telephone during that period. An outreach 
counselor also visited Nicini once a week and filed a report 
that supported Cyrus's testimony at the February 28 
hearing that Nicini appeared to be doing well there. 
 
Nicini did not tell Cyrus of the sexual assaults during the 
visits Cyrus made with him or during the phone 
conversations Cyrus made to him while he was at the 
Morra home, although the assaults began within two or 
three days of Nicini's arrival there. Nicini, albeit a minor, 
was not of such tender years that he was unable to 
communicate this information. He was fifteen years old and 
had left an earlier placement to find the Morras on his own. 
Significantly, although Nicini testified at the February 28, 
1991 hearing he did not inform the court of the assaults. 
Nor, apparently, did he inform his attorney, who likewise 
mentioned nothing of the assaults at the hearing. Thus, the 
record reveals little from which Cyrus could have inferred 
that Nicini faced a "substantial risk of serious harm." 
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 
 
Nicini relies on two factual bases for imposition of 
liability on Cyrus. He points to Cyrus's testimony at the 
February 28 hearing that there was nothing the agency saw 
"in terms of problems with the law." App. at 156.11 There is 
nothing in the record to support Nicini's argument that 
Cyrus made an affirmative representation that he"checked 
out" Morra. The record reflects that Cyrus was frank and 
forthright as to the extent of his inquiry into the 
appropriateness of the Morra home. He advised the judge 
that he had done a PERP check and advised what that 
check disclosed. There is no suggestion that the judge was 
unaware of the extent of investigation that the PERP check 
entailed, as it appears this is a routine investigation. Cyrus 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We have held that caseworkers are entitled to absolute immunity "for 
their actions on behalf of the state in preparing for, initiating, and 
prosecuting dependency proceedings. Their immunity is broad enough to 
include the formulation and presentation of recommendations to the 
court in the course of such proceedings." Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. 
of Chester County, 108 F.3d 486, 495 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Miller, 174 
F.3d at 376 n.6 (immunity does not extend to investigative or 
administrative acts). 
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testified that the Morras were not a foster care family but 
that Nicini needed a stable environment before DYFS could 
attempt to resolve the larger family problems. When the 
court asked whether the Morras would qualify as para- 
foster parents, Cyrus responded that they would but 
cautioned that he had only completed the PERP check. 
 
The other basis for Nicini's claim against Cyrus is that he 
was "placed on notice" about the Morra home by the 
allegations of Nicini's mother. However, Cyrus alerted the 
judge to the fact that Nicini's mother objected to placement 
with the Morras. When the judge asked Mrs. Nicini for her 
views, she informed him of reports that the Morras' son 
took drugs and that "something just seems strange about 
these people" in light of their willingness to take an 
unknown child into their home. App. at 158. Mrs. Nicini 
voiced concern and suspicion but never made any more 
specific allegations, and did not advise Judge Segal of all of 
her concerns when she had the opportunity to do so. 12 
 
Nicini argues that Cyrus should have elicited alcohol and 
substance abuse through a urine analysis. But Nicini 
completely ignores the fact that the judge heard Mrs. 
Nicini's objections and expressly declined to require drug 
monitoring as requested by Nicini's attorney because there 
was "no indication that drugs are involved in this matter." 
App. at 168. The judge then approved placement of Nicini 
at the Morra home, specifically holding that Nicini would 
"come[ ] under the care and supervision" of DYFS and that 
he would remain at the Morras as long as DYFS thought it 
"appropriate." App. at 167. Nicini points to nothing else in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. In her deposition taken in this case years after the events, Nicini's 
mother described the "objections" to which Cyrus referred at the hearing. 
She testified that she spoke to Cyrus prior to the hearing on February 
28, 1991 and told him of a cassette that contained a message from 
Nicini in which Nicini said he was "partying and having a good time over 
there drinking" at the Morras. App. at 250 (expert report). Nicini's 
mother also testified that she expressed "other concerns about the 
drinking and the drug use that I felt went on over there, about the 
juveniles that hung around over there . . . . I expressed a lot of 
concerns 
to him about the Morra home and Tony's placement." Id. Nicini makes 
no effort in his brief to explain his mother's failure to discuss these 
allegations in more detail at the hearing. 
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the post-hearing period that should have put Cyrus or 
DYFS on notice that continued placement with the Morras 
was inappropriate. 
 
In her vigorous dissent, our colleague would have us 
second-guess Cyrus's actions from hindsight. That is not 
our task. Nor is it called for in the circumstances of this 
case. The dissent relies heavily on the report by Dr. Atkins 
to assert that despite his compliance with DYFS policies 
Cyrus should be liable for failing to engage in a"heightened 
level of inquiry, interview and investigation." Dissenting Op. 
at 33. But Dr. Atkins, who never interviewed the persons 
involved, focuses "particularly" on Cyrus's failure to obtain 
Morra's consent to a criminal background check without 
pointing to specific facts from which Cyrus should have 
inferred that such a check was necessary. The fact that 
Nicini's "problems went well beyond those of the average 
troubled juvenile" under DYFS care and supervision, 
Dissenting Op. at 31, furnished Cyrus no clue about the 
appropriateness vel non of the Morra home as a placement. 
Given that the only reason Cyrus had to question the 
appropriateness of the Morra home was the suspicions of 
Nicini's mother and father,13 Nicini's insistence on 
remaining at the Morra home, and Cyrus's first-hand 
impression that Nicini was "doing well there," App. at 155, 
an impression corroborated by Nicini's TRIS worker and by 
Nicini himself at the hearing before Judge Segal, a jury 
could not permissibly conclude that Cyrus's investigation 




13. The dissent quotes liberally from the deposition testimony of Nicini's 
father but fails to mention that Nicini's father did not suggest that he 
relayed these concerns to Cyrus. Indeed, it is unclear from his deposition 
whether Nicini's father ever informed anyone he suspected Morra to be 
a pedophile. When asked for specific details of the concerns he relayed 
to an unnamed DYFS employee in "1988 give or take a year," App. at 
230, Nicini's father replied: "About the placement of children into foster 
care homes. My concern with my son [Danny] as far as what he was 
doing. And I was trying to make them understand my form of discipline 
versus another individual that he may socialize with, their parents." App. 
at 231. 
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Nor are we persuaded by the cases cited by the dissent 
in which other courts determined a jury could reasonably 
find deliberate indifference because the facts in those cases 
are not analogous to those in this case.14  It may be 
dramatic to attempt to analogize Cyrus to a caseworker who 
"allow[s] a child to starve before his eyes," Dissenting Op. at 
40 n. 14, but, so far as the record reveals, there was 
nothing "before [Cyrus's] eyes" that suggested that Nicini 
faced a substantial risk of serious harm. To the contrary, 
Nicini's TRIS worker confirmed that while at the Morra 
home Nicini was no longer suicidal, no longer depressed, 
and appeared to be adjusting well. 
 
The evidence adduced by Nicini, even when interpreted 
most favorably to him, not only falls short of the demanding 
standard for deliberate indifference set forth in Farmer, it 
also fails to establish that Cyrus was more than negligent, 
if it even establishes that. The District Court did not err in 
holding Nicini failed to prove a case for subjecting Cyrus to 
substantive due process liability. Because the period 
between the court hearing and Nicini's flight from the 
Morra home was a limited one, spanning barely over two 
weeks, we express no view of a caseworker's responsibility 




Nicini's State Law Claims 
 
We likewise conclude that the District Court did not err 
in granting summary judgment for Cyrus on Nicini's state 
tort law claims based on qualified immunity. The District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. For example, in Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 857 (2d Cir. 1996), 
the officials knew plaintiff was diabetic, in insulin shock, and in need 
of 
immediate hospitalization, but refused to take him there. Similarly, in 
Chavez v. Cady, 207 F.3d 901 (7th Cir. 2000), there was sufficient 
evidence that the detainee's need for medical care was obvious to 
defendants. By contrast, in Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 
1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1673 (2000), a case not cited, the court 
held summary judgment was appropriate despite a report by plaintiff 's 
expert that further action was necessary, because there was no objective 
evidence that plaintiff had serious need for medical care. 
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Court noted that "[t]he exact nature of [Nicini's] state law 
claims against Cyrus is not readily apparent on the face of 
his complaint," slip op. at 17, but Nicini agrees that the 
court properly characterized his claims as relying on the 
"same factual bases . . . which supported the 1983 
actions," Appellant's Br. at 18. 
 
Cyrus asserts that he is entitled to immunity under 
section 59:3-3 of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, which 
provides that "[a] public employee is not liable if he acts in 
good faith in the execution or enforcement of any law." N.J. 
Stat. Ann. S 59:3-3. Negligence is insufficient to defeat the 
immunity provided by section 59:3-3. See Canico v. 
Hurtado, 144 N.J. 361, 365, 676 A.2d 1083, 1085 (1996) 
("A public employee, although negligent, may still act in 
good faith."). Instead, to overcome immunity under this 
section, "a plaintiff must prove more than ordinary 
negligence." Id. Summary judgment under section 59:3-3 is 
appropriate if a public official establishes that his or her 
"acts were objectively reasonable or that they performed 
them with subjective good faith." Id. 
 
Nicini has not argued that Cyrus is ineligible for the 
immunity provided by this statute, which applies to public 
officials engaged in the execution or enforcement of the law. 
Rather, he contends that Cyrus's conduct amounted to 
"reckless indifference." Appellant's Br. at 19. We have 
concluded that Cyrus's conduct amounted, at most, to 
negligence. Therefore, the District Court did not err in 
granting summary judgment in his favor on the state law 
claims based on qualified immunity. See B.F. v. DYFS, 296 
N.J. Super. 372, 385-86, 686 A.2d 1249, 1256-57 (N.J. 
Super. 1996) (DYFS employees immune for efforts to 




For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the 
District Court entering judgment in favor of Frank Cyrus. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
The majority engages in an extensive and well-reasoned 
assessment of the underlying legal principles relevant to the 
substantive due process standard to be applied in this 
custodial care setting. Unfortunately for Anthony Nicini, 
however, the majority does not appear to have considered 
whether the real-life controversy before us -- whether 
Frank Cyrus's conduct actually fell below this standard -- 
should be heard or decided by a jury under the legal 
principles it espouses. This is because Cyrus was, in the 
majority's view, merely negligent, and maybe not even that. 
I dissent because I believe that more than one reasonable 
inference can be drawn from the facts, including an 
inference of deliberate indifference that shocks the 
conscience, making it inappropriate to dispose of Nicini's 
case on summary judgment. See United States v. Diebold, 
Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam). Having used 
Nicini's case as a vehicle to explore and analyze a 
particularly complicated legal standard, have we given short 
shrift to, and failed to appreciate the complexities of, 
applying the legal standard to the facts of the case itself? I 
suggest that we have. 
 
Nicini's story as chronicled by the majority leads neatly to 
its conclusion that Cyrus was, at most, merely negligent. 
But there is more than one way to view or perceive what 
Cyrus did, or failed to do, in furtherance of his duty to 
Nicini, who, although not of "tender years" as the majority 
notes, was a suicidal and "high risk" adolescent in need of 
hospitalization or intensive outpatient care.1 Due process is 
contextual and due process rules should not be applied 
mechanically. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 
U.S. 833, 850 (1998); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 
172 (1952). Although mere negligence is not sufficient to be 
a substantive due process violation, "culpability falling 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Even if the majority is correct that, as a general matter, "foster 
children, particularly older ones, enjoy a greater degree of freedom and 
are more likely to be able to take steps to ensure their own safety," this 
assumption is hardly applicable to Nicini, a suicidal and severely 
depressed victim of physical abuse who repeatedly manifested a 
tendency to take actions that did not further his own safety and welfare. 
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within the middle range, falling from something more than 
negligence but `less than intentional conduct, such as 
recklessness or gross negligence' . . . is a matter for closer 
calls." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849 (citation omitted). "[T]he fact 
that there can be instances where glaring negligence may 
not constitute deliberate indifference does not mean that a 
fact finder is barred from equating negligence of a certain 
dimension with deliberate indifference." Doe v. New York 
City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 
1981). Considering the facts in the light most favorable to 
Nicini, the non-movant, as we are required to do on 
summary judgment, it certainly appears possible that 
Cyrus's conduct might cry out "indifference" to a 
reasonable jury. Indeed, whether or not a defendant's 
conduct amounts to deliberate indifference has been 
described as a "classic issue for the fact finder" and "a 
factual mainstay of actions under S 1983." Armstrong v. 
Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 577 (7th Cir. 1998). 2 
 
It is hardly a struggle to present the facts in a way that 
gives rise to an inference of culpability greater than mere 
negligence. An unrebutted expert report in the record, 
which receives scant attention in the majority opinion, does 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Other courts similarly have characterized this question as one for the 
fact finder when the issue is less than clear-cut. See, e.g., Weyant v. 
Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 857 (2d Cir. 1996) (reversing grant of summary 
judgment because a reasonable jury could infer from the record, taken 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, that the defendants were 
deliberately indifferent); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 588 n4 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (reversing grant of summary judgment because defendant's 
conduct could be construed to be deliberately indifferent; "a jury 
presented with these facts might find Ostrander's conduct to have been 
`deliberately indifferent,' `reckless,' `grossly negligent,' or merely 
`negligent.' ") (citing Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638, 
641 (9th Cir. 1988) ("When reasonable persons may disagree as to 
whether particular conduct constitutes negligence, gross negligence, or 
recklessness, the question is one of fact to be decided by the jury.")). 
The 
Supreme Court recently likened section 1983 actions to tort claims for 
purposes of Seventh Amendment application, and explained that as a 
general historical matter, juries decided questions of liability, which 
"preserved the jury's role in resolving what was often the heart of the 
dispute between plaintiff and defendant." City of Monterey v. Del Monte 
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 718-719 (1999). 
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much of the work for us. This 13-page, single-spaced report 
of psychologist Elliott L. Atkins, Ed.D., P.A., provides a 
detailed account of the facts and opines unequivocally that 
Cyrus's conduct was far more egregious than the majority 
suggests is conceivable. I believe that this unrebutted 
expert opinion evidence by itself can, and does, create a 
genuine issue of disputed fact sufficient to defeat Cyrus's 
motion for summary judgment. See Thomas v. Newton Int'l 
Enters., 42 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 1994). 3 At the very 
least, however, the Atkins expert report takes us on a 
guided tour through the record, including DYFS records 
and Cyrus's own testimony, exposing what Cyrus knew or 
should have known about Nicini and the Morras and 
making it glaringly obvious that some investigation was 
necessary before placing a suicidal teenager in a home 
where children were permitted to "drink and party." 
 
Atkins focuses first on Nicini's condition and particular 
needs. Nicini's problems went well beyond those of the 
average troubled juvenile. As such, Nicini required a 
heightened level of attention by those charged with 
responsibility for his care. The DYFS records depict Nicini 
as the victim of repeated physical abuse at the hands of his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See generally Chavez v. Cady, 207 F.3d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(concluding that a material fact existed as to whether the treatment 
provided by the defendant was a substantial departure from accepted 
professional judgment based on the substance of the defendant's 
expert's testimony); Russo v. City of Cincinnati , 953 F.2d 1036, 1047 
(6th 
Cir. 1992) (reversing grant of summary judgment in section 1983 action 
alleging failure to train police officers, and noting that "expert 
testimony 
may prove the sole avenue available to plaintiffs to call into question 
the 
adequacy of a municipality's training procedures. To disregard expert 
testimony in such cases would, we believe, carry with it the danger of 
effectively insulating a municipality from liability for injuries 
resulting 
directly from its indifference to the rights of citizens. Reliance on 
expert 
testimony is particularly appropriate where, as here, the conclusions rest 
directly upon the expert's review of materials provided by the City 
itself."). Compare Fagin v. City of Vineland , 22 F.3d 1296, 1307 (3d Cir. 
1994) (en banc) (affirming grant of summary judgment in police pursuit 
case, and noting that the only evidence introduced by the plaintiffs to 
show arbitrary, intentional, and deliberate action by the defendants was 
expert witness testimony, but their expert witness"expressly disclaimed 
any such characterization" of the defendants' conduct). 
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father. They explain how Nicini made several attempts at 
suicide and self-harm, including slashing his wrists and 
stomach, drinking peroxide, and ingesting pills. App. 212- 
214, 243-244. They reflect that Nicini had both long term 
and recent problems of such severity as to require intensive 
outpatient care, or, more likely, hospitalization. A DYFS- 
paid psychiatrist's report from January 9, 1991-- shortly 
before Cyrus acquiesced in Nicini's placement with the 
Morras -- noted that Nicini: 
 
       [I]s actively suicidal, in a major depression, very 
       impulsive and bored. Out-patient treatment is not 
       enough. 
 
App. 245.4 Cyrus's own contact sheet entry stated: 
 
       Worker conferred with supervisor who directed worker 
       to contact Crisis (JFK) for evaluation of Anthony Nicini 
       today. Worker contacted parent (Helen Nicini) and 
       advised her [sic.] recommendations of Dr. Trigiani and 
       parent was asked to pick Anthony up from aunt's 
       home and take him to JFK Crisis - parent agreed to do 
       this. Worker contacted JFK crisis and indicated that 
       Dr. T's evaluation and recommendation would be faxed 
       to them - this was done. Worker advised parent (Helen) 
       upon request of abuse unit that she would have to stay 
       with child in case he needed to be admitted. 
 
App. 222, 245. 
 
Atkins also explains how Nicini escaped through the 
window of the JFK psychiatric unit, deciding by himself 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. During Nicini's family court hearing, Judge Segal reported on a 
telephonic report from a TRIS worker who opined that Nicini was no 
longer depressed or suicidal at that particular time and had "made a fine 
adjustment to the location where he's presently located," but also 
mentioned that the "the option of placement in a longer term facility like 
the residential placement . . . like Ranch Hope is a very good option" and 
noted that Nicini needed continuing psychotherapy and perhaps anti- 
depressants "if things do not clear up for him." App. 166-167. Judge 
Segal also noted that "all the doctor has is an assessment of Tony and 
he doesn't have a full basis on which to make an evaluation. But he had 
sufficient information from his assessment to indicate that it will be a 
long time before this boy goes back home." App. 167. 
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that he "didn't feel like staying in the hospital." App. 164, 
224-225.5 In addition to the medical evidence, Nicini's 
relatives expressed concerns about Nicini's severe health to 
DYFS and at the family court hearing, noting that Nicini 
was not likely to voluntarily succumb to the treatment he 
desperately needed. App. 160, 246- 247.6  
 
Cyrus acceded in Nicini staying with the Morras in the 
face of Cyrus's awareness of Nicini's "history of 
mistreatment, physical abuse, depression, self-destructive 
behavior and suicidality, as well as his protracted absence 
from school . . . [and] the long-standing history of rejection, 
neglect, and abuse." App. 248. Atkins explains that it 
should have been -- and was -- clear to Cyrus that a 
caregiver for Nicini needed to provide a secure, emotionally- 
stable, and supportive environment, and needed to be able 
to provide skillful and knowledgeable intervention. To 
determine whether the Morras could provide such an 
environment and intervention in light of Nicini's high-risk 
situation likely entails a heightened level of inquiry, 
interview and investigation. 
 
As Atkins helps to document, however, Cyrus made little 
or no effort to discover whether the Morra householdfit any 
of the requisite characteristics. Cyrus failed to address the 
most basic issues when he interviewed the Morras after 
Nicini went to their home upon escaping from the hospital. 
Any information about the Cyrus-Morra interview comes 
from Cyrus himself because the routine written 
documentation of such an interview is curiously absent 
from the DYFS records.7 Cyrus could not recall if he asked 
the Morras whether they had ever been arrested, convicted, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. A psychologist at JFK held a bed for Nicini after he ran away, and the 
police picked up Nicini at the Morra residence, yet Cyrus gave Nicini 
permission not to go back to the hospital but, rather, to stay at the 
Morras' home. App. 225, 246. 
 
6. One of Nicini's aunts also stated at the hearing that she believed 
Nicini had attacked her daughter: "This isn't just something that's 
happened all of a sudden, it's been going on for at least a year and a 
half 
. . . and he doesn't mean this, he doesn't." App. 161. 
 
7. When asked about this absence, Cyrus said that he remembered 
"writing something, but I don't know if its in here or not." App. 252. 
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or otherwise had contact with law enforcement, nor did he 
ask the Morras how long they had lived in New Jersey to 
gain perspective on the helpfulness of the PERP check, 
apparently because he "just didn't think to ask them that." 
App. 251. Instead, Cyrus remembered asking the Morras 
whether there was anything that would prevent them from 
becoming foster parents, to which he received a negative 
response. Cyrus did not ask what the Morras did for a 
living. He did not ask whether they owned or rented their 
residence. Cyrus could not even recall with certainty that 
he had talked to the Morras about Nicini's mental health 
history. In essence, there hardly was a meaningful 
investigation, let alone a heightened inquiry, of the Morras' 
fitness to be Nicini's caregivers. Does it not matter that 
Cyrus failed to make inquiries fundamental to placing any 
child, let alone a physically-abused and suicidal teenager in 
desperate need of a stable environment? Did this conduct 
merely fall below an acceptable standard, as the majority 
concludes, or was Cyrus indifferent over a period of several 
weeks when he should have detected a problem and when 
he could and should have acted? 
 
Cyrus would have us forgive any weaknesses in his 
inquiry because "no one knew or even remotely suspected 
that the Morra home was a dangerous environment," Brief 
for Appellee at 14, but the undisputed facts belie Cyrus's 
assertion, at least for purposes of summary judgment. 
Putting aside whether Cyrus would have had reason to 
suspect that the Morra home was a dangerous environment 
had he asked them even one or two more basic questions, 
both of Nicini's parents relayed express concerns to DYFS 
about the Morras, and about placing Nicini with the 
Morras. According to her deposition testimony, Mrs. Nicini 
had told Cyrus prior to the family court hearing about an 
answering machine cassette tape with a message to Nicini's 
aunt from Nicini saying that he is "partying and having a 
good time over there drinking" at the Morra residence. App. 
250. Mrs. Nicini says she also made Cyrus aware in 
advance of the family court hearing about: 
 
       [M]y other concerns about the drinking and the drug 
       use that I felt went on over there, about the juveniles 
       that hung around over there, young kids all hours of 
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       the night and how Danny used to come home from that 
       place. I expressed a lot of concerns to him about the 
       Morra home and Tony's placement. 
 
App. 250. Mrs. Nicini explained some of her concerns at the 
family court hearing: 
 
       And now these people that he's with now, the Morras, 
       they have harbored my oldest son on several occasions 
       when he had taken off, and at one point even have had 
       their house surrounded and went in and got him. Now 
       maybe he didn't tell these people that he was runaway 
       or anything. I don't know them personally, only-- only 
       what I had heard. My oldest daughter knows -- goes to 
       school with kids that are friends with Eric Morra, their 
       son, which I believe is 16 or 17, and I've been told that 
       he's into drugs. I don't know if it's true or not, but it's 
       just what I've heard. I don't know, something just 
       seems strange about these people, why they would-- 
       if they don't know Tony, why they would even take him 
       in. I'm sure that Tony knows them through my oldest 
       son Danny. 
 
App. 158-159. In light of Mrs. Nicini's concerns, Nicini's 
counsel commented that "maybe something should be 
looked in [sic.] with this Morra family, in light of what Mrs. 
Nicini had said I think maybe a closer investigation on 
whether or not that's an appropriate placement for 
Anthony." App. 163. 
 
At the hearing, Cyrus acknowledged the existence of Mrs. 
Nicini's objections, but was somewhat dismissive, instead 
emphasizing that the Morras had an interest in Nicini and 
would not mind having him there, and that Nicini was 
stable at the Morra home. App. 155-156.8  In any event, the 
information provided by Mrs. Nicini to Cyrus prior to the 
family court hearing apparently did not make a lasting 
impression on Cyrus, as he could not articulate her 
concerns about the Morras at his deposition: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Indeed, it appears that Cyrus may have characterized the Morras as 
a friend of the Nicini family, although it is not entirely clear due to a 
possible error in transcription. See App. 154, lines 13-14. See also App. 
155 (Cyrus explaining that Nicini "found his way to the Morras, who I 
guess was a friend of his."). 
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       [I]t seems like it is more like something that she had 
       heard about him or heard about the family or 




Mr. Nicini had expressed concerns to DYFS about the 
Morras as well. According to the deposition testimony of 
Nicini's father, as recounted by Atkins, Mr. Nicini told 
DYFS that the Morra home was a "haven for runaway 
juveniles." App. 250. DYFS records indicate that Mr. Nicini 
said the Morra home was not a good placement, although 
he would agree to weekend placement.9 According to Mr. 
Nicini, this was not the first time he had ever relayed 
concerns about the Morras, an earlier time being in 
connection with Nicini's brother Danny: 
 
       Q: If it was around 1988 give or take a year that 
       Danny stayed or visited the Morra home, was it around 
       that time in which you suspected that Mr. Morra was 
       [sic.] pedophile? 
 
       A: I suspected that he was exploiting children. 
 
       Q: Did you suspect that there might be drugs in th e 
       household at that time? 
 
       A: I felt that these children were going over ther e and 
       in some way they had access to drugs and alcohol. 
 
          . . . . 
 
       A: Around that time Danny was already involved wit h 
       DYFS; is that correct? 
 
       Q: Yes. 
 
       A: Was his case worker Frank Cyrus at that time? 
 
       A: I believe so. 
 
       Q: Did you notify anyone at DYFS regarding your 
       concerns that you have shared with me regarding the 
       Morra household that there might have been some 
       child sex there? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The DYFS record entry also reflected that Mr. Nicini was "not pleased, 
Anthony not in hospital. He's going to call JFK Crisis to find out who 
psychiatrist is that released child." App. 227. 
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       A: During what period? 
 
       Q: You indicated that Danny might have been stayin g 
       at the Morra household and that you had your 
       suspicions that there might be sexual abuse or some 
       type of child abuse at the home; is that correct? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: Did you notify or tell anyone at DYFS about tho se 
       suspicions that you had? 
 
       A: I had mentioned it to a social worker. . . . 
 
          . . . . 
 
       Q: Do you recall what concerns or concern exactly you 
       expressed to that person? 
 
       A: About the placement of children into foster car e. My 




Mr. Nicini's objections apparently left even less of an 
impression on Cyrus than Mrs. Nicini's, as Cyrus initially 
disavowed in his deposition having any recollection of 
objections by Mr. Nicini to placing his son with the Morras. 
After having the aforementioned DYFS record entry read to 
him, Cyrus recalled that he was likely aware of Mr. Nicini's 
objection but did not bother to pursue it further: 
 
       Q. Were you ever aware of that particular objectio n? 
 
       A. Yeah, I think I was, now that I read this over. 
 
       Q. Okay. Did you ever contact Mr. Nicini to discus s 
       with him the basis of his objections? 
 
       A. No. 
 
       Q. Was there any reason for that? 
 
       A. No. No, I think, you know, like I was saying, w e 
       were feeling, you know, good about the placement 
       because everything was positive, everything was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Mr. Nicini made clear in this deposition that he and his wife had 
never authorized Nicini's brother Danny to stay with the Morras. App. 
231. 
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       pointing toward him doing well there and becoming 
       stabilized and progressing, and so we had no real 




Failing to follow up on specific concerns communicated 
to him and to DYFS about the Morras as an acceptable 
placement for Nicini who, only weeks beforehand, was said 
to be actively suicidal and in need of hospitalization, Cyrus 
advocated that Nicini stay with the Morras, about whom he 
knew little or nothing, telling Judge Segal that Nicini was 
stable at the Morra house, that he was "doing very well 
there, no problems." App. 155.11 And, largely on the basis 
of Cyrus's position and representations, Judge Segal 
ordered Nicini to remain with the Morras "for so long as 
[DYFS] thinks that's an appropriate placement." App. 167. 
Judge Segal had asked Cyrus if the Morras' home would 
qualify as a para-foster home, to which Cyrus responded 
"[y]es they would." App. 156. Although Cyrus qualified his 
answer by saying that the only thing he had done was a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. A jury might wonder on what basis Cyrus could report to Judge 
Segal that everything was positive. Cyrus's explanation seems to be 
premised on an assumption, embraced by the majority to some extent, 
that no further action was necessary to discharge his duties to Nicini as 
long as certain parties professed to be content. Nicini claimed he liked 
staying at the Morras, and, as Cyrus noted in his deposition, "Nicini 
refused to go elsewhere." App. 145. The Morras were willing to have him 
remain there and reported that there were "no problems." Of course, 
when the Morras gave that report to Cyrus, Mr. Morra already had been 
giving Nicini drugs and sexually abusing him, telling Nicini he would 
have no place to go if he disclosed these activities. App. 232, 238. Could 
not a jury find Cyrus's attitude to be an indictment rather than a 
satisfactory explanation for Cyrus's inaction? After all, on Cyrus's 
theory, 
a case worker would never unearth a problem until it is too late. Should 
not the concern have been the stability of the environment for this 
suicidal youngster who had just climbed out the window of the 
psychiatric ward, rather than whether he professed to be content there? 
In light of Cyrus's weak and ineffectual -- and perhaps even indifferent 
-- responses provided with respect to the numerous signposts of 
potential danger with the Morra placement, it would not be difficult to 
imagine a jury concluding that Cyrus's inaction rose to the level of 
deliberate indifference if, during a trial, Cyrus were to provide similar 
responses and to demonstrate a similar attitude. 
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PERP check, Cyrus assured Judge Segal that "[t]here's no 
-- nothing we've seen in terms of any problem with the law 
. . . . right now they are not an official foster family, 
although I'm sure they would -- they would apply for para- 
foster custody if the parents are willing to let them." App. 
156-157. Cyrus explained again in his deposition that he 
had received updates from the Morras themselves. App. 
226-227. 
 
Concluding that the "background information available to 
Frank Cyrus which was completely ignored was 
substantial," Atkins opines as follows at the conclusion of 
his detailed report on Cyrus's handling of Nicini's case: 
 
       The ongoing disregard of pertinent information at 
       various stages of the investigation demonstrates not a 
       simple negligent breach but a pattern of deliberate 
       indifference to the right of Anthony Nicini to be secure 
       in a safe environment and to be offered the same 
       opportunity for protection/supportive services from 




Although this expert report illustrates how the facts 
could produce an inference of deliberate indifference, the 
majority swiftly dismisses the relevance of Atkins' report in 
its entirety, apparently based on the fact that Atkins did 
not explain how Cyrus could have performed a national 
police search without the permission of the Morras. 13 
Interestingly, Cyrus would have obtained the requisite 
permission, or been confronted with the refusal of 
permission, had Cyrus conducted a proper interview at the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Atkins also opined that Cyrus's "multiple breaches constituted a 
pattern of indifference to his statutory and/or professional duty such 
that I conclude with a reasonable degree of psychological probability that 
this pattern of conduct arose not from mere negligence but from 
deliberate indifference to his obligation to conduct a proper 
investigation 
and directly caused the injuries claimed by Anthony Nicini." App. 242 
 
13. The majority further characterizes the report as "focus[ing] 
`particularly' " on this issue "without pointing to specific facts from 
which 
Cyrus should have inferred that such a check was necessary." I can only 
wonder whether the majority is reading the same detailed, 
comprehensive report that I have described. 
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outset and asked basic questions that reasonably should 
have been explored before entrusting Nicini to the Morras, 
such as those posed to a para-foster applicant. Yet, Cyrus 
neither asked the pertinent questions, nor sought 
permission to do the search, until it was too late. 
 
The majority properly concludes, in my view, that Cyrus 
and DYFS had a special relationship with Nicini and thus 
were charged with affirmative duties. Nicini was in the care 
and custody of the state. However, in light of its recognition 
of this duty, and in light of what the facts and expert 
witness testimony suggest that Cyrus knew or should have 
known about Nicini and the Morras, can one so facilely 
conclude as well that no reasonable jury could infer 
"deliberate unconcern for plaintiff 's welfare from a pattern 
of omissions revealing deliberate inattention to specific 
duties imposed for the purpose of safeguarding plaintiffs 
from abuse"? See Doe, 649 F.2d at 144; Taylor v. Ledbetter, 
818 F.2d 791, 797 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (adopting Doe 
articulation of deliberate indifference and finding that a 
foster child may bring a section 1983 action alleging that 
government officials were deliberately indifferent regarding 
her foster home placement).14 As the Supreme Court noted 
in Lewis, "[w]hen such extended opportunities to do better 
are teamed with protracted failure even to care, indifference 
is truly shocking." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853. By rejecting the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Although Nicini does not specifically challenge whether Cyrus 
complied with certain DYFS requirements (e.g. , conducting a PERP 
check), and thus Doe is distinguishable in that respect, the substantive 
due process violation would be based on the state's alleged failure to 
provide for basic human needs of those in its custody, see DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989), 
regardless of whether the state has specifically regulated regarding all 
of 
those needs. Surely we do not allow states to defeat substantive due 
process allegations by setting minimal standards for child welfare case 
workers. Would it not violate substantive due process for a state welfare 
case worker, with the requisite level of culpability, to allow a child to 
starve before his eyes, notwithstanding the absence of a specific state 
regulation requiring the feeding of children in the custody of the state? 
In light of other evidence giving rise to a strong inference of deliberate 
indifference, the fact that Cyrus took certain minimal steps required by 
DYFS regulations will not, by itself, defeat that inference or remove 
Cyrus's conduct from the realm of consideration. 
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valid competing inference clearly raised by the facts and 
concluding at this juncture that Cyrus's conduct was at 
most merely negligent as a matter of law, I believe the 
majority has short-circuited the process of addressing 
Anthony Nicini's substantive due process rights. 
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